Poincaré, Sartre, Continuity, and Temporality

Titre :

Poincaré, Sartre, Continuity, and Temporality

Sujet :

Philosophie

Description :

In this paper, I examine the relation between Henri Poincaré’s definition of mathematical continuity and Sartre’s discussion of temporality in Being and Nothingness. Poincaré states that a series A, B, and C is continuous when A=B, B=C and A is less than C. I explicate Poincaré’s definition and examine the arguments that he uses to arrive at this definition. I argue that Poincaré’s definition is applicable to temporal series, and I show that this definition of continuity provides a logical basis for Sartre’s psychological explanation of temporality. Specifically, I demonstrate that Poincaré’s definition allows the for-itself to be understood both as connected to a past and future and as distinct from itself. I conclude that the gap between two terms in a temporal series comprises the present and being-for-itself, since it is this gap that occasions the radical freedom to reshape the past into a distinct and different future.

Créateur :

Gingerich, Jonathan

Source :

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 37, No. 3, October 2006

Date :

2006-10

Relation :

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1712947

Format :

application/pdf

Langue :

en

Type :

Article de revue ; Texte

Description

In this paper, I examine the relation between Henri Poincaré’s definition of mathematical continuity and Sartre’s discussion of temporality in Being and Nothingness. Poincaré states that a series A, B, and C is continuous when A=B, B=C and A is less than C. I explicate Poincaré’s definition and examine the arguments that he uses to arrive at this definition. I argue that Poincaré’s definition is applicable to temporal series, and I show that this definition of continuity provides a logical basis for Sartre’s psychological explanation of temporality. Specifically, I demonstrate that Poincaré’s definition allows the for-itself to be understood both as connected to a past and future and as distinct from itself. I conclude that the gap between two terms in a temporal series comprises the present and being-for-itself, since it is this gap that occasions the radical freedom to reshape the past into a distinct and different future.

Auteur

Gingerich, Jonathan

Date

2006-10

Source

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 37, No. 3, October 2006

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